

**INFORMATION REPORT**

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COUNTRY Indochina

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SUBJECT Further Information on the Proposed Revolt  
of the Yellow Dragon Organization

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1. On 9 June 1950 a representative of the Yellow Dragon (Hoang Long) organization was in Hanoi for discussions with Prince Buu Loc concerning its proposed revolt against the Viet Minh in the mountainous area west of Phuly (105-55, 20-33).

2. The emissary outlined the proposal of his organization as follows:

There are five Viet Minh regiments in this area, with headquarters at Choben. The Chief of Staff of Interzone 3 at Choben is Hoang Ich, a non-Communist who would be a leading figure in the early stages of the revolt. Hoang Ich plans to dispose of the Communist General Hoang Sam and the political commissars in an overnight coup, and to assume command of the five regiments. The first blow would be struck by Major Huyuh Sam, a battalion commander. Sam and his second in command estimate that two-thirds of their battalion would immediately support the revolt. Communist elements in the battalion would be liquidated in a surprise purge.

3. The Yellow Dragon representative stated that the organization was prepared to revolt at any time; but that before taking action, it demanded the following assurances from Bao Dai and the French:

- that the zone which came under the control of the Yellow Dragon organization would be entirely free of French administrative, economic, and military control;
- that immediately after the revolt, the zone would be supplied with arms, ammunition, and medical supplies;
- that the Yellow Dragon organization would owe no allegiance to Bao Dai until Bao Dai had rid Viet Nam of the French.

Therefore, after the initial phase of the revolt, Major Sam's battalion would take up a position which would enable it to prevent French intervention and to insure delivery of supplies from the east. At this stage of the revolt Hoang Ich would assume leadership at Choben. The planners

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of the revolt recognize that the early stages of the revolt would be risky, but they feel that if the revolt were successful, similar uprisings would occur throughout Viet Minh territory in North Viet Nam. Furthermore, the Yellow Dragon zone could serve as a base of operations for attacks against the remainder of Viet Minh troops in Tonkin.

4. On about 9 June Bao Loc promised the Yellow Dragon representative that the proposal would be put before a Vietnamese Cabinet meeting to be held in mid-June. If approved, the proposal would then be submitted to the French.
5. On 12 June Le Thanh Canh, personal representative of Bao Dai in Hanoi, contacted the Yellow Dragon representative, Captain Le Minh, who is second in command of Viet Minh Battalion 136. Canh told Captain Minh that Bao Dai saw no necessity for the proposed independent zone, since arrangements already existed for the welcome of all unconditional deserters from the Viet Minh and for the purchase of their arms.
6. The Yellow Dragon organization then conceded that its zone could be placed under the military control of Bao Dai and the civil control of Nguyen Huu Tri, Governor of North Viet Nam. The organization remained adamant against any French participation.
7. When Captain Minh returned to Viet Minh territory with Bao Dai's negative reply, Hoang Ich wrote a letter to Governor Tri urging him to accept the Yellow Dragon conditions. Hoang Ich stated that the Communists were becoming increasingly suspicious and were intensifying their propaganda against his troops. He further stated that many of the men he had won over to the movement were becoming disaffected because of its lack of progress.
8. On 17 June a Yellow Dragon representative interviewed Governor Tri. Tri produced a telegram showing that he had been ordered to meet Bao Dai in Dalat on 19 June, and that this meeting would involve reconsideration of the Yellow Dragon proposal.
9. On 22 June Governor Tri, having returned from the south, gave an interview to the resident Hanoi representative of the Yellow Dragon organization, Nguyen Dac Vinh. Governor Tri stated that Bao Dai was now prepared to take the proposal seriously and to meet its main conditions.
10. By 23 June Governor Tri had ordered the Chief of the Vietnamese Surete and Police in North Viet Nam, Nguyen Dinh Tai, to confer with Nguyen Dac Vinh about forming an action committee charged with assuring support to the Yellow Dragon organization from adjacent Bao Dai-controlled territory.

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